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Abstract: Precipitated by rapid globalization, rising inequality, population growth, 
and longevity gains, social protection programs have been on the rise in low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs) in the last three decades. However, the introduction 
of public benefits could displace informal mechanisms for risk-protection, which are 
especially prevalent in LMICs. If the displacement of private transfers is considerably 
large, the expansion of social protection programs could even lead to social welfare 
loss. In this paper, we critically survey the recent empirical literature on crowd-out 
effects in response to public policies, specifically in the context of LMICs. We review 
and synthesize patterns from the behavioral response to various types of social 
protection programs. Furthermore, we specifically examine for heterogeneous 
treatment effects by important socio-economic characteristics. We conclude by 
drawing on lessons from our synthesis of studies. If poverty reduction objectives are 
considered, along with careful program targeting that accounts for potential crowd-out 
effects, there may well be a net social gain. (JEL D64, H31, H55, J14, J22, J26, O15, 
O16, R2) 
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I. Introduction 
 
Many countries have enacted social programs in an effort to assist vulnerable groups 
manage a wide array of risks – economic, social, political, health, and environmental. To this 
end, large-scale social safety net programs were introduced in the post-Industrial Revolution 
period and became especially prominent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In Europe, 
nations enacted social welfare legislation as early as the 1880s1 and the United States 
introduced sweeping social protection programs2 shortly after the start of the Great 
Depression (Flora 2017). In contrast, the rise of social protection in developing countries did 
not occur until late in the 20th century (World Bank 2001), and such programs were frequently 
introduced in response to guidelines by international organizations.3 Around the same time, 
the role of social protection in developing countries also increased following widespread 
failure of growth-based structural adjustment policies. 
In the last three decades, the rapid expansion of social protection in developing 
countries can also be attributed to several economic forces. The first is globalization, which 
exposed open economies to the volatility of global financial markets while simultaneously 
creating opportunities for growth (Rodrik, 1998; 2001). In the 1980s and 1990s, many nations 
in Latin America and East Asia experienced dramatic economic transformation. The 1997 
financial crisis, however, precipitated sudden and severe economic setbacks in both regions. 
The increased poverty laid bare glaring gaps in social protection (World Bank 2001). Second, 
worsening inequality and the potential threat of social unrest impelled many leaders to 
strengthen national social safety nets. In particular, following major financial crises, social 
protection programs were introduced in Brazil (Britto 2008) and Indonesia (Sumarto et al. 
2008). Third, the growing population size in East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa 
also acted as a strong impetus for social protection. The world’s population has increased 
fourfold in the past century.4 Two final forces, gains in longevity and declining fertility rates, 
                                                          
1 Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany was the first country to adopt a formal old-age social insurance 
program in 1889 (Williamson and Pampel 1993). 
2 By as early as 1931, the United States had witnessed a hundred bills that related to old-age pensions across 38 
different state legislatures (VCU 2019). The introduction of such social programs likely lead, according to The 
Luxembourg Income Study, to a decrease in the share of elderly Americans who live in poverty from 24 percent 
to 12 percent over the years 1979 to 1987. Ahmad (1991) attributes this decline directly to the growth in social 
security retirement benefits.  
3 Mesa-Lago (2002) reviews the experience of Latin American countries – Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba and 
Brazil – that initiated various forms of social programs as early as the 1920s.  
4 Population projections predict sustained growth, from 6.7 billion in 2006 to 9.2 billion in 2050 (UN 2017).  
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further contributed to aging population structures and expansions in social protection as many 
governments faced mounting pressure to tackle old-age poverty.5 All together, these forces 
have unambiguously accentuated the need for more expansive safety nets, especially for the 
expanding geriatric population.  
This rapid demographic change will likely continue to see the expansion of safety net 
programs as well as their associated fiscal burden across the developing world (World Bank 
2017; Lustig 2010). If the costs in emerging economies mirror those of the OECD nations, 
nations such as China could end up spending around 12 percent of GDP (World Bank 
2018)—making it particularly important to focus on the cost-effectiveness of such programs. 
This mounting fiscal burden will strain the resources in developing countries whose fiscal 
capacities are already under immense stress.  
 The introduction of social protection could displace already existing informal 
mechanisms for risk-protection, an issue that is especially salient in developing countries. The 
possibility that public transfers displace existing private transfers, a scenario that is also 
known as crowding-out6, could hamper the distributive impact of new public programs. 
Crowding-out could occur if altruistic donors reduce their transfers as public interventions 
increase the incomes of recipient groups. If the displacement of private transfers is large 
enough, the expansion of social protection programs could even lead to a social welfare loss.7  
Empirical estimates of the crowd-out effect from social programs in developed 
countries suggest that behavioral responses to public programs are relatively small.8 However, 
                                                          
5 Over the last 50 years, life expectancy at birth has increased globally by 20 years (WHO 2003). The largest 
longevity gains have been in developing countries: between 1950 and 2002, the longevity gain in the poorest 
developing countries has been 26 years. The increase of the elderly as a fraction of total population has been 
especially pronounced in developing countries: the fraction of individuals aged 65 to 85 increased globally from 
13 percent to 33 percent between 1950 and 2010 (World Bank 2017). Globally, the number of persons aged 80 
and older is projected to triple between 2017 and 2050, from 137 million to 425 million (UN 2017).  
6 Crowding-out is the phenomenon whereby public sector spending (or involvement) reduces private forms of 
spending oriented towards the same objective. Feldstein and Liebman (2002) review the literature on various 
forms of crowding out in the context of programs in high-income countries. 
7 Using data from the Philippines, Cox and Jimenez (1995) estimate that public provision of unemployment 
insurance displaced 91 percent of private transfers. Similarly, Jensen (2003) and Maitra and Ray (2003) estimate 
that the provision of pension benefits to black South Africans displaced 20 to 40 percent of private transfers to 
the elderly. 
8 Numerous studies in developed countries examine for crowding-out of public transfers on familial transfers. 
Several empirical studies use data from the U.S. and Germany (Cox & Jakubson, 1995; Reil-Held, 2006; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1994). For example, Cox and Jakubson (1995) estimate that a one dollar increase in 
public welfare spending in the United States lead to a 12 cent reduction in remittances. Also, in the U.S., Altonji, 
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997) find that parents increase remittances to a child by 13 cents for every one dollar 
reduction in that child’s income. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) examine how the increase in government 
welfare aid influenced financial support for young daughters and found that government transfers did displace 
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developed countries have a long history of public transfers that has gradually eroded informal 
mechanisms. Therefore, the experience of industrialized countries may not be a useful guide 
for studying the same phenomenon in developing countries.9 In fact, formal insurance markets 
in the context of the developing world are thin and largely nonexistent (Roth, McCord, and 
Liber 2007, pp.15-19). Instead, informally arranged insurance schemes play a predominant 
role in providing support to those in need and can take the form of domestic or international 
remittances, in-kind gifts, and subsidized loans. Furthermore, idiosyncratic demographics 
such as large extended families, the prevalence of informal mechanisms for financial support, 
and inter- or intra-household financial transfers in support of the elderly call for a case-by-
case examination of the magnitude of crowding-out.  
In this paper, we critically survey the recent empirical literature on crowding-out 
induced by public policy, specifically focusing on the developing world. As noted earlier, 
developing countries have experienced a rapid increase in social protection programs, leading 
to an increase in the number of empirical studies concerning the impact on private transfers. 
Moreover, because of leaps in the quality and availability of data, most of these new studies 
directly test for crowding-out of private household transfers. We review and synthesize the 
evidence from recent empirical studies, exclusively focusing on studies that use experimental 
or quasi-experimental methods equipped to detect the causal effects of policy programs. We 
pay close attention to how crowding-out varies by several categories: type of social 
protection, identification strategy, geographic area, and contemporaneity. Furthermore, we 
specifically examine whether studies test for heterogeneous treatment effects by socio-
economic factors. To this end, we report and discuss heterogeneous impacts by gender, 
income, education, and urbanicity. Finally, and most notably, we draw important lessons 
based on our review of the studies.  
                                                          
the familial transfers from parents to their daughters. Using U.S. data, Schoeni (2002) found a substantial 
crowding-out effect of public transfers in the form of unemployment insurance on familial transfers among older 
parents to their adult children; the study’s estimate of the crowd-out effect is 20–40 percent for each dollar 
increase of unemployment insurance. Reil-Held (2006) uses data from Germany and confirms earlier conjectures 
that the introduction of public pay-as-you-go pensions reduced familial transfers from children to their parents. 
9 Empirical estimates of the crowd-out effect from social programs in developed countries suggest that 
behavioral responses to public programs are relatively small, however, several important differences between 
developing countries and developed countries could result in differential crowd-out effects: strength of family 
ties, tradition of filial piety, size of social program benefits, the duration, recency and history of the introduction 
of public benefits, and individual altruistic preferences towards other family members.  
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The design and targeting of social protection programs depend on the type of risks or 
economic distress afflicting vulnerable groups. Broadly, risks can be classified by the level at 
which they occur (i.e., micro, meso, and macro) and by the nature of the event (e.g., natural, 
economic, political, social, health, and environmental). Micro risks are idiosyncratic and only 
affect specific individuals or households. Meso shocks strike groups of households or larger 
communities. Such shocks are common to all households in the group. Macro risks relate to 
shocks that occur at the national or international level. To manage and cope with risks, 
households and communities rely on both formal and informal strategies. Informal strategies 
generally refer to arrangements among individuals and households without any formally 
agreed on legal, financial, or enforcement framework. Private and informal transfers in 
developing countries can substitute for functions that formal social protection programs 
perform in high-income countries. Private transfers for old-age support, for example, act as 
social security for households in developing countries. In a community where emergencies 
occur on a small-scale, informal insurance may suffice. However, if a widespread shock 
occurs, such as that wrought by an earthquake, informal networks will no doubt struggle to 
respond as the networks of friends, relatives, and local community members are impacted 
simultaneously (Landmann, Vollan and Frölich 2012). 
As there is diversity in risk, so too is there in the set of social protection policies. In 
this paper, we specifically focus on the intergenerational crowding-out of private transfers in 
three categories: social assistance programs (including programs that target vulnerable groups 
and communities), social security and pension programs, and other insurance programs.10 In 
the social assistance category, we include transfer programs that are exclusively based on a 
means-tested criterion. Such programs are usually targeted at low-income or vulnerable 
groups. In the social insurance group, we include transfers that are based on events, such as 
unemployment, disability, or age. 11,12 Social insurance programs rely on risk-pooling 
mechanisms and are usually contributory in nature; beneficiaries receive benefits or services 
in recognition of contributions to a scheme. We split the social insurance classification into 
two groups; due to the rise of age-related programs, we report results from age-related social 
                                                          
10 A more nuanced social protection categorization (ADB 2003) encompasses four activities: active labor market 
policies, social insurance programs, social assistance and welfare service programs, and area-based schemes to 
address community vulnerability. 
11 We use the definition of social insurance based on Nelson (2004), Baicker and Chandra (2008), Chetty and 
Finkelstein (2013), and Ziebarth (2018).  
12 Programs exclusively means-tested programs are excluded from this group. 
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protection programs separately. Therefore, the social security and pensions group in our 
classification is exclusively comprised of programs for age-based events. The other social 
insurance group incorporates programs such as health, unemployment or other insurance.13,14  
We report two aspects of the crowding-out response: (1) the full magnitude of the 
crowd-out effect (which incorporates both the probability of receiving any positive private 
transfers and the amount of private transfers received by those who receive positive transfers), 
and (2) only the likelihood of receiving any positive informal private transfer (also referred to 
as the extensive margin). Our synthesis of this growing body of empirical estimates reveals 
several major takeaways. The evidence is overwhelming that public benefits are indeed likely 
to result in displacement effects, in some settings as high as 91 percent. This pattern 
somewhat defies that of developed countries as reviewed by Feldstein and Liebman (2002). 
Although some studies in developed countries show considerable crowding-out, the overall 
pattern based on the experience of developing countries points to larger estimates. Second, the 
presence of the behavioral response is robust to the type of social protection offered. Although 
there appears to be some variation across program types, we note consistent evidence of a 
sizable crowd-out effect induced by all social protection types. Third, the crowd-out response 
can vary by important socio-economic characteristics of the public benefit recipients. In 
particular, gender, educational status, and poverty status play an important role. Two studies 
that provide results disaggregated by gender, one in Bangladesh (McKernan et al. 2005) and 
the other in Mexico (Juarez 2009), report complementary results across social assistance and 
pension programs, respectively. The pattern shows that if the recipient is male, the crowd-out 
effect is larger than that of a female recipient. Interestingly, in Mexico (Juarez 2009), the 
study reports results that illuminate the interplay between gender and poverty status: the 
crowd-out for a recipient who is female and who is very poor is considerably larger than the 
crowd-out for a recipient who is female and non-poor. Jensen (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Juarez (2015) report a gender-based pattern for the crowd-out effect of pension programs 
in South Africa and Mexico, respectively. However, the pattern is reversed to the one we find 
                                                          
13 We follow the standard definition of such programs, which entails a formal enaction based on statutes, explicit 
provision based on income or prior contributions, financing by taxes, and a defined target group. We exclude 
pension programs from this group and present estimates for aging-related or pension programs as a standalone 
category.  
14 Ghana first legislated its National Health Insurance Scheme in 2003. The law was passed as an alternative to 
the existing “cash and carry” system (Strupat and Klohn 2018). In China, demographic pressures lead to the 
creation of the New Rural Society Endowment Insurance Program (Yifan 2014). 
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in McKernan et al. (2005) and Juarez (2009): for pension benefits, if the recipient is female, 
the crowd-out effect is larger than if the recipient is male. Only one study, Nikolov and 
Adelman (2019), disaggregates estimates of the crowd-out effect by poverty status: the results 
show that the crowd-out effect is considerably larger for poor versus non-poor households. 
The theoretical interplay between inter-household allocations and public transfers can 
be ambiguous and has been the subject two major models: the altruism and exchange models. 
Barro (1974) and Becker (1974) are among the first set of studies to conceptualize the 
crowding-out hypothesis; in their frameworks, the studies posit that households behave like 
infinitely-lived “dynasties”.15 The theoretical analysis in these studies model private savings 
as a buffer for financial position changes in the public sector. In other words, in Barro 
(1974)’s theoretical framework, a bond-financed tax cut leads to an equal ex ante increase in 
private savings and thus can match the implicit future tax liability – a change in public debt 
can result in no change to interest rates, output, and price levels.16 The main takeaway of 
Barro (1974)’s model is that the provision of benefits due to government policies, such as 
social security programs that influence the intergenerational distribution of resources, can be 
undone by a substantial reduction in intergenerational private family transfers. An alternative 
hypothesis that has been posited by the theoretical literature is that people derive utility from 
giving and providing for others. The pleasure that individuals may derive stems from better 
status or acclaim within their community, or they simply experience a "warm glow" from 
having performed an ethically justifiable act for other community members. Altruism, a term 
first introduced by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974), occurs when family members are 
concerned with the economic and material well-being of others. In this setting, the utility of 
the household member, the donor, positively depends on the well-being of another household 
member, the recipient (Becker 1974). For upstream intergenerational transfers (i.e., transfers 
that flow from children to parents), the more altruistic the children are, the higher the average 
amount of private transfers that their parents receive. An important prediction underpinning 
                                                          
15 Barro (1974) focuses on whether an increase in government debt constitutes an increase in perceived 
household wealth. The model adds a theoretical assumption of finite lives within the context of an overlapping-
generations model of the economy. The paper demonstrated that households would behave as though they were 
infinitely lived. Therefore, the net result of this behavior is that government bonds will generate no marginal net-
wealth effect in the presence of an operative chain of intergenerational transfers which connect current to future 
generations. 
16 A critical point regarding whether this “equivalence” between public finance methods holds hinges on the 
belief that a change in the composition of public spending acts as a significant mechanism of influence on the 
private sector economy. 
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the altruism model for intergenerational transfers is that if a recipient’s income increases, then 
the donors are less likely to transfer money to that recipient as their economic need has been 
lowered. In the context of an altruistic framework with social protection programs, a similar 
prediction holds: the child may lower the amount of his or her private transfers if their parents 
start receiving public income benefits. If replacement of private transfers by public transfers 
(i.e., crowding-out) is intense enough, there could be a dollar-for-dollar crowd-out, resulting 
in no change to geriatric welfare.  
In contrast to the altruistic model, Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) model 
private transfers as motivated by a system of explicit service exchanges between parent and 
child. In this exchange model of private transfers, crowding-out may not occur. The 
relationship between the welfare of the adult child and his parent can be expressed as the 
welfare of children being dependent on the receipt of goods and services, such as household 
chores and grandchildren care, provided by the parents to adult children. In this framework, 
the higher the provision of service from parent to adult child, the lower the parental well-
being and time for leisure. If the government introduces a monetary benefit to the parent, then 
the parent is less dependent on the support of adult children. Consequently, based on the 
assumptions in the exchange model, the parental terms of trade with adult children increases. 
To sustain the same level of services as the level enjoyed before the introduction of public 
benefits, adult children would then need to increase the amount of monetary transfers relative 
to the period prior the introduction of public benefits. This increase in private transfers can 
effectively be conceived as a “crowding-in” effect. Other theoretical studies17 that model 
intergenerational economic dynamics also factor in bequest motives, arguing that the 
introduction of program transfers need not necessarily crowd-out private intergenerational 
                                                          
17 Another possibility that does not pit each framework against the other is that both the altruism and the 
exchange motives might coexist. In this framework of co-existing motivations, the one set of motives may 
dominate over the other depending on the characteristics of the recipient and/or donor. Consistent with this 
reasoning, Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) posit a dual system in which a household can switch between the 
two regimes based on their poverty status. In this study, as the household economically transitions from low-
income to high-income status, the exchange model becomes a more compelling framework to explain what 
drives private transfers than the altruism framework, which prevails when recipient income is low. Conceptually, 
in Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004), private transfers exhibit diminishing returns. Based on the assumptions in 
the model, if transfers are indeed motivated by exchange motives, then private transfers will initially increase 
and then decrease, thereby exhibiting the inverted-U-shaped relationship between the amounts of private 
transfers and the recipient’s income. 
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support for parents as children may still have incentives to sustain private transfers in 
expectation of parental inheritance (Lueth 2003; Nishiyama 2002). 
Examining the empirical magnitude of the crowd-out effect is important for several 
reasons. First, large crowd-out effects have implications for the efficiency of public transfer 
programs; if the crowding-out is extremely large, larger than the public benefits provided to 
beneficiaries, such programs may impose a net cost to those beneficiaries. Such displacement 
effects could occur in response to a wide range of programs, including unemployment 
insurance, social insurance, health insurance, cash transfers, or pension benefits. Second, the 
presence of crowding-out also has important implications for program evaluation. An analysis 
based on household data that tracks the household’s income from all sources, including public 
transfer income, would overstate the distributional impacts of the public program, including 
its impacts on poverty. Finally, crowding-out can provide important insights into the family 
structure and intergenerational extended family behavior. For example, the behavioral 
response to the introduction of programs can reveal whether and how households share 
resources and the extent to which individuals remain interlinked within a larger social 
framework. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe 
the empirical evidence regarding intergenerational transfers associated with each of the three 
social protection categories: social assistance, social security and pension programs, and other 
social insurance programs. In Section III, we specifically highlight a comparison between the 
crowding-out by program type and geographic area. In Section IV, we examine if there is any 
empirical support for heterogeneous impacts by beneficiary or donor socio-economic 
characteristics. The final section concludes. 
 
II. Intergenerational Transfers in Response to Social Protection Benefits 
 
In this section, we review empirical studies that estimate the magnitude of the behavioral 
response to social protection benefits. Regarding the crowd-out effect, we follow the conceptual 
approach in McDonald and Moffit (1980) and Juarez (2009) who decompose the effect (in 
response to income benefits) into two components: 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇|𝑋, 𝑌)
𝜕𝑌
=
𝜕 Pr(𝑇 > 0|𝑋, 𝑌)
𝜕𝑌
𝐸(𝑇|𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑇 > 0) + Pr⁡(𝑇 > 0)
𝜕𝐸(𝑇|𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑇 > 0)
𝜕𝑌
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For each individual i, 𝑌𝑖 is individual pre-transfer income, 𝑇𝑖 is the amount of private transfers 
received from donors in other households, and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of baseline individual 
characteristics. This expression shows the full crowd-out effect as the sum of the income 
effect on the probability of receiving positive transfers and the income effect on the amount of 
transfers received for those receiving positive transfers. Specifically, we report the full crowd-
out effect (
𝜕𝐸(𝑇|𝑋,𝑌)
𝜕𝑌
) and its extensive margin component (the probability of receiving any 
positive private transfers). We follow this approach in reporting the magnitude of the 
behavioral response to either a change in a continuous income variable or in response to a 
binary indicator of program participation.18 
We first review overall program impacts in response to various types of interventions 
(social assistance, social security and pension programs, and other insurance programs).  
 
A. Social Assistance Programs 
 
In this section, we synthesize results from studies that specifically estimate the crowd-
out effects of private transfers in response to social assistance programs. Within this category, 
we include programs that capture means-tested transfers, in cash or in-kind, regardless of the 
demographic that these programs target. Across the studies that specifically analyze data in 
response to social assistance programs, almost all studies detect some evidence of crowding-
out. The range of empirical estimates of the crowd-out effect varies from zero percent to -88 
percent, with a median of -0.457. Estimates also vary in their precision. In Table 1, we report 
the estimates from studies using data in developing countries in the context of social 
assistance programs. We report the full effect and its extensive margin component in response 
to an income change (in columns 8 and 9) or in response to program participation (in columns 
10 and 11). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                          
18 Some studies opt to report results in response to income changes and some studies opt to report the crowd-out 
effect in response to program participation.  
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Two of the studies that detect the smallest crowd-out effect are Van den Berg and 
Cuong (2011), and McKernan et al. (2005). Each study imprecisely estimates a crowd-out 
effect of 0 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Using data on 4,216 individuals and their 
households in Vietnam, between 2004 and 2006, Van den Berg and Cuong (2011) study the 
effect of social assistance benefits on subsequent private transfers. Vietnam’s social security 
net includes many programs, including both contribution-based and non-contribution-based 
transfers. The main non-contributory scheme is the National Targeted Program (NTP) and 
various social allowances. In their study, Van den Berg and Cuong (2011) focus on social 
allowances disbursed in cash. The study finds no evidence of crowding-out, which constitutes 
the smallest effect size found among all the studies that examine the impact of social 
assistance programs. Similarly, McKernan et al. (2005) find a small crowd-effect. This study, 
based in Bangladesh, analyzes the impact of microcredit loans on private transfers between 
1991 and 1999. The study relies on data from a panel survey on the BRAC Microcredit 
program, which collects information on households including their income, debt, and familial 
transfers. Based on this data and survey period, the study reports a crowd-out effect of 25 
percent.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum are the estimates from Mejía-Guevara (2015), 
which finds a large crowd-out effect in response to social assistance benefits. The study relies 
on data from Mexico and assesses the effects of socio-economic inequality on the reallocation 
of intergenerational flows using estimates for two years, 1994 and 2004. The study shows that 
the reallocation of economic resources, mainly to children and the elderly, changes 
substantially, estimating a crowd-out effect of 88 percent.  
In addition to documenting changes in the amount of transfers, it is important to shed 
light on whether program benefits induce any change (regardless of how large or small) on the 
probability of receiving transfers (the extensive margin). Table 1 also reports these effects 
(column (8) reports the extensive margin in response to income changes; column (10) reports 
the extensive margin in response to a change in program participation). Such estimates can 
illuminate whether the introduction of program benefits can influence the family structure of 
transfers within interfamilial networks. The estimates of the effect on the extensive margin 
range from 0.001 to -0.49, with a median of -0.03. These estimates indicate that, for those 
households and individuals who receive social assistance benefits, the change in the 
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probability of receiving a future private transfer is higher than for those individuals who are 
not affected by the specific policy intervention.   
 
B. Social Security and Pension Programs 
In contrast to the studies that examine the effect of social assistance, studies that 
examine the influence of social security and pension benefits rely on a specific, single, policy 
intervention. In this group, we include social insurance programs for age-based events 
(excluding means-tested programs). An important point to underscore is that the majority of 
programs in this category have been implemented in upper-middle-income settings. This 
feature may be unsurprising as, in general, a country’s demographic transitions toward old age 
in later stages of economic development (Sudharsanan and Bloom 2018), a phenomenon that 
coincides with enhanced fiscal capacity systems capable of supporting large-scale retirement 
programs. In the past three years alone, several studies have been published that focus on the 
relationship between public and private transfers in China (Cheng et al. 2016, Chen et al. 
2017, and Nikolov and Adelman 2019), all of which use specific pension schemes as a natural 
policy experiment.  
Table 2 summarizes the studies that examine the impact of pension benefits on 
intergenerational family transfers. The majority of studies in this category rely on difference-
in-differences study design (DD or DDD), whereby some regions that adopt pension benefits 
serve as a treatment group and are compared to plausible control regions that do not adopt the 
program. Pension programs are often implemented by staggered rollouts, providing a natural 
lane to classify geographic areas into treatment and control groups. Additionally, pension 
eligibility requirements generally rely on an age threshold, which can serve as another 
potential source of exogenous variation in either DDD designs or regression discontinuity 
designs (RDD). 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 In this category, fewer studies report evidence of a crowd-out effect: 5 out of 14 
studies that report estimates either find little to no evidence of crowding-out or report 
imprecisely estimated zeros. However, a few studies in this category (e.g., Gibson et al. 2001, 
Juarez 2009, and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez 1998) also report sizable estimates of crowding-out. 
Overall, the median estimate of crowding-out across all studies in this group is 27 percent.  
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The lowest crowd-out effect has been estimated in the context of pension programs in 
China, where the government has adopted a national rural pension scheme. Two studies that 
examine the crowd-out effect in accordance with this program are Nikolov and Adelman 
(2019) and Cheng et al. (2016).19 Nikolov and Adelman (2019) exploit a staggered rollout of 
China’s New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS) and use data from 2009 to 2013 based on the 
China Health and Retirement Survey. The study implements a triple difference approach, 
based on the staggered implementation of the pension policy across the country, and examines 
the effect of the retirement program on the incidence and the amount of inter vivos transfers 
sent to beneficiaries of the public program. To estimate the effect of the public program, the 
study uses variation across communities, which adopt the pension program between 2009 and 
2013. The focus of the study is the DDD estimator. It captures the average program effect on 
private transfers for individuals who are 60 years of age or older and who live in a community 
that implemented the pension program versus individuals who are 60 years of age or older but 
live in a community that did not adopt the program. The study finds that the receipt of pension 
benefits reduces the likelihood that beneficiaries receive inter vivos transfers from their 
children. However, the estimated reduction is quantitatively small. Although the overall 
findings of the results estimated in Nikolov and Adelman (2019) are consistent with previous 
empirical studies, the study finds a considerably smaller effect size than other studies that use 
data from developing countries. Similarly, Cheng et al. (2016) examine the effect of the same 
pension program but its focus is on various forms of private transfers and finds the same 
qualitative effect of the program as Nikolov and Adelman (2019).20 Using a DD design, the 
study exploits the staggered rollout and finds no evidence of a crowd-out effect in the context 
of the program.  
                                                          
19 Chen et al. (2017) and Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2014) also find negligible crowding-out. Chen et al. (2017) 
uses parametric and semi-parametric analyses to estimate crowding-out over quartiles of pension receipts. They 
find minor crowding-out at the lowest and highest quartiles but crowding-in at the second and third—concluding 
that, overall, there had been a crowding-in of private transfers resulting from a Chinese urban contributory 
pension program. Additionally, Galiani, Gertler, and Bando (2014) uniquely analyze crowding-out resulting 
from the non-contributory universal pension scheme “Assistance for Older Rural Adults Program” in Mexico. 
The authors use a two-period, two-good utility model to capture the effects of pension receipt on individual 
consumption and labor supply. They demonstrate that, for those in the treatment group, the reduction of income 
(due to increased leisure) and concurrent increase of consumption account for almost the entire public pension 
amount. Thus, using this logic, they argue that private transfers among the treated remained unchanged, 
indicating no crowding-out. 
20 Adelman and Nikolov (2018) use a sample of 11,717 individuals who face a defined-contribution, while 
Cheng, Liu, Zhang and Zhao (2016) use a much smaller sample of 412 individuals who participate in the NRPS 
under a non-contributory stipulation. 
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However, some studies in this group do find evidence of large crowding-out. Chuang 
(2012) uses data from Taiwan and reports the category’s largest crowd-out effect of almost 92 
percent in response to an old-age farmer’s allowance.21 Juarez (2009) estimates the effect of 
an arguably exogenous increase of annual income, a demogrant for individuals 70 years or 
older and residing in Mexico City, on the average amount of private transfers provided to the 
elderly. The transfer amount from the program was approximately 60 U.S. dollars per month 
and represented, on average, 30 percent of the monthly income of individuals who qualified 
for the benefit. The monetary benefit was not subject to taxes and was solely conditioned on 
age. The study uses data from the Mexican Income and Expenditure Survey, called ENIGH, 
between 1996 and 2004. Using a two-stage least squares estimation coupled with a Tobit 
method adjustment, the study estimates the impact of program benefits on two types of 
transfers: domestic transfers received from within Mexico and transfers received from abroad. 
The estimated crowd-out effect in Juarez (2009) is 86 percent. 
In Table 2, we report the estimated effects of public pension receipt on the incidence 
of future transfers (column (8) reports the extensive margin in response to income changes 
while column (10) reports the extensive margin in response to a change in program 
participation). The range of estimates varies from a 61 percent decrease (Juarez 2009) to a 20 
percent increase (Kang 2004). Kang (2004) uses household data from Nepal encompassing 
the years 1995 to 1996 and is the only study to both find no evidence of crowding-out and 
document the opposite phenomenon of crowding-in. The study shows that public transfers 
lead to crowding-in of private transfers, on the extensive margin, by as much as 21 percent. 
Although the authors do not provide an in-depth explanation of this result, they offer two 
plausible explanations for the anomaly. They point to the fact that public transfers are not 
widespread in Nepal (in comparison to other low-income countries) as a likely driver of the 
estimated effect size. Additionally, they explain that the average amount of private transfers is 
likely too small to be displaced by public income benefits.  
 
C. Other Insurance Type Programs 
 
                                                          
21 The Old-Age Farmers’ Welfare Allowance was implemented in 1995 by the Taiwanese government to 
improve the life quality of geriatric farmers. The purpose is to provide financial support to those elderly farmers 
who are genuinely financially disadvantaged. 
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The final category comprises studies that examine the effects of other insurance-
related interventions, such as health insurance or unemployment insurance, excluding any 
social security or pension-related programs.22 Table 3 reports the empirical estimates from 
studies whose analysis focuses on intergenerational responses to formal or informal insurance 
schemes.23  
[Table 3 about here] 
Most notably, almost all studies document evidence of crowding-out in response to 
these programs. In fact, out of the three types of social protection programs for which we 
synthesize results, insurance programs exhibit the largest for crowding-out. With that said, the 
estimates range from 8 percent in Ghana (Strupat and Klohn 2018) to 91 percent in the 
Philippines (Cox and Jimenez 1995), with a median of 21 percent.24  
Strupat and Klohn (2018) investigate the relationship between informal transfer 
networks and formal health insurance in Ghana, an ideal setting because of the important role 
informal family support plays in the country. The study design relies on a comparison 
between districts with and without access to the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), 
which launched in 2003. Specifically, the study uses data on the implementation of the health 
insurance program for the period between 1998 and 2006. The primary source for data on the 
informal transfers is the Ghanaian Living Standard Household Survey, which covers 90 
districts within the country. Using a difference-in-differences design, Strupat and Klohn 
(2018) find that the introduction of the formal health insurance scheme resulted in non-trivial 
crowd-out effects of informal transfers. Their estimated effect-size for the displacement of 
                                                          
22 Insurance, in this case, is defined to encompass a range of formal and informal networks that provide 
individuals and households with relief from a money-demanding emergency—e.g., a natural disaster or health 
complication. 
23 We include findings from four experimental studies, which specifically examine crowding-out in the context 
of informal insurance markets and developing countries. Landmann, Vollan, and Frölich (2012), the earliest and 
most cited of the four studies, bases the experiment on a solidarity game procedure and subsequently utilizes a 
Tobit model to test for crowding-out. Lin, Liu, and Meng (2014) implement a theoretic altruism model and a 
dictator game to test for crowding-out among a sample of individuals in China. Cecchi, Duchoslav, and Bulte 
(2016) also run a lab in-the-field experiment distinctly based on a public goods game. They exploit a health 
micro-insurance project implemented in Uganda to identify participants who had access to the insurance. Lastly, 
Lenel and Steiner (2017) gather a sample of individuals from Cambodia and implement a “transfer” game that 
borrows aspects from both solidarity and dictator games. The results from these lab experiments bolster the base 
of empirical evidence documenting sizeable crowd-out effects. 
24 Hasegawa (2017) examines the effects of national health insurance rollouts in Vietnam on informal support 
and various risk-coping measures, such as the sale of assets. The study is the only one that does not find support 
for crowding-out but its observational study design is ill-equipped to detect causal effects. 
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received private transfers is approximately 8 percent.25 Interestingly, they also estimate the 
displacement effect for transfers given, finding a larger effect-size of approximately 20 
percent. One explanation the authors give for this discrepancy is asymmetric information 
between donors and recipients—recipients that are covered by the insurance may still receive 
transfers from districts where the NHIS is not yet available.  
The largest crowd-out estimate in response to a formal insurance program in a 
developing country comes from Cox and Jimenez (1995). Cox and Jimenez (1995) use data 
from the 1988 Family Income and Expenditure Survey in the Philippines. The main 
components of the social program in the Philippines comprises food subsidies, public works 
subsidies, and livelihood creation programs. The study not only attempts to estimate the 
causal effects of the Philippines’ insurance program but is also methodologically unique 
because it attempts to estimate any possible nonlinear effects of public income benefits on 
private transfers by modeling individual income based on a spline function. The main feature 
of the spline specification approach is an income parameter that is allowed to vary over 
different levels of income. In particular, the study fixes the spline nodes at quartiles based on 
pre-transfer income. Using these parameter estimates, the study estimates the displacement 
effect of unemployment insurance on private transfers received to be 91 percent for a sample 
of unemployed urban males.  
 Table 3 also reports estimates on the direct effect of the introduction of other 
insurance programs on the incidence of subsequent private transfers (column (8) reports the 
change in the likelihood of a positive transfer in response to income benefits; column (10) 
reports the change in the likelihood of a positive transfer in response to program 
participation). The table’s estimates range from -0.055 in Mexico, found in Orraca-Romano 
(2015), to a marginal effect of -0.12 in Ghana, reported in Strupat and Klohn (2018). The 
median estimate is -0.09, which implies a relatively sizable effect on the extensive margin 
within this category.    
 
                                                          
25 Another study that reports a crowd-out estimate that is among the lowest for insurance programs is Lin et al. 
(2014). The study, based on a lab experimental design, includes a series of within-subject dictator games to 
measure individual altruism. The study’s empirical estimate of crowding-out is approximately 20 percent.  
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III. Comparison by Social Protection Type and Geography 
We next examine how the intergenerational response for private transfers differs by 
type of social protection and geographic area.  
 
A. Does the Type of Social Protection Matter? 
 
Together, Tables 1, 2, and 3 indicate that the largest crowding-out occurs in response 
to social assistance programs, among which the median crowd-out effect is approximately 46 
percent. Despite ubiquitous evidence of crowding-out associated with social assistance 
programs, there is no ostensible pattern of variation of the effect size magnitude by country 
income classification. 
Although the category of other insurance programs does not exhibit the highest 
median estimate for the total crowd-out effect, almost all of the studies we include in the 
category of other insurance programs report a moderate crowding-out effect. Studies 
conducted in Cambodia (Lenel and Steiner 2017), Ghana (Strupat and Klohn 2018), China 
(Lin et al. 2014), and Mexico (Orraca-Romano 2015) all, remarkably, fall within the crowd-
out range of 20 to 30 percent. Although there is little variation in the country income 
classification for this group of social protection, the empirical effect-size of crowding-out 
appears to be larger in low-income countries (Philippines and Cambodia) than in middle-
income countries (China and Mexico), at least in the small set of studies that we synthesize. 
 Crowding-out within the social security and pension benefits category, i.e., programs 
targeting the elderly, exhibits more heterogeneity. Five out of the fourteen studies that report 
results, indicate either very small crowding or imprecisely estimated zero impacts on private 
transfers. However, some studies in this category report a considerable crowding out (e.g., 92 
percent reported in Chuang et al. 2016, and 86 percent reported in Juarez 2009). The overall 
median empirical estimate of crowding-out for private transfers is only 27 percent.  
 Regarding the overall pattern of the estimated effect-size on the incidence of 
subsequent intergenerational transfers: generally, other insurance programs lead to a higher 
(as compared to social assistance programs and pension programs) decrease of the incidence 
of future transfers; the effect size of the extensive margin associated with social assistance 
programs is the lowest.  
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B. Geographic Areas and Crowding Out 
 
We also examine for patterns across broad geographic areas using the full crowd-out 
effect and its extensive component. The empirical crowd-out effect is largest in Latin America 
(for social assistance programs), East Asia and Latin America (for social security and pension 
programs), and South East Asia (for other insurance programs); the lowest effect size 
estimates vary by program type and there is no evidence of a consistent geographic pattern. 
The largest drop in the incidence of subsequent intergenerational transfers is in Latin 
America. We see this across two separate categories, social assistance programs (Albarran 
and Attanasio 2003), and social security and pension programs (Juarez 2009). Overall, Latin 
America consistently seems to exhibit the largest behavioral response across both margins. 
 
IV. Is There Evidence of Heterogeneous Effects? 
 
In extrapolating results from the studies we review, it is important to keep in mind that 
people may respond differently to the same policy intervention—a possibility that researchers 
refer to as “treatment heterogeneity.” Uncovering differences in the behavioral response by 
specific demographic factors can be informative for policy-targeting and improving the design 
of existing programs. 
 In Tables 4, 5, and 6, we report and re-examine the behavioral response to social 
protection, extracting information from studies that implement heterogeneous subsample 
analysis. We report the heterogeneous treatment effects for social assistance, social security 
and pension programs, and social insurance programs, respectively. We follow the same style 
as in the main tables: we report the full crowd-out effect and the extensive margin component 
in response to either income benefits (columns 8-9) or in response to program participation 
(columns 10-11). In general, the subsample analyses we synthesize report these effects by 
three main characteristics: income, gender, and urbanicity. 
[Table 4 about here]  
Table 4 reports the heterogeneity of impacts for the social assistance programs. The 
one study that provides results disaggregated by gender is McKernan et al. (2005) in 
Bangladesh. The pattern shows that if the recipient is male, the crowd-out effect is larger than 
the effect associated with a female recipient. In Taiwan, Gerardi and Tsai (2014) investigate 
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heterogeneous effects across individual characteristics. In particular, looking at the 
educational attainment status for both recipient and sender: higher educational attainment 
appears to exhibit a protective effect on the extensive margin. 
In Table 5, we report program effects elicited by social security and pension benefits. 
The studies in South Africa (Jensen 2003) and Mexico (Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez 2015) 
demonstrate a clear and consistent gender-based pattern for the crowd-out effect. However, 
this pattern is reversed to the one found in Juarez (2009) and McKernan et al. (2005). In 
Jensen (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), if the recipient is female, the crowd-
out effect is larger than if the recipient is male. Interestingly, in Mexico (Juarez 2009), the 
study reports results that illuminate the interplay between gender and poverty status: the 
crowd-out for a recipient who is female and very poor is considerably larger than the crowd-
out for a recipient who is female and non-poor. Only one study, Nikolov and Adelman (2019), 
disaggregates estimates of the crowd-out effect by poverty status: the results show that the 
crowd-out effect is larger for poor versus non-poor households. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Only a handful of studies disaggregate their estimates for subsamples in response to 
other social insurance programs (reported in Table 6). The ones that do so provide 
information on how the behavioral response differs by gender, poverty status, and urbanicity. 
The full crowd-out effect is larger for females (than for males) and for individuals living in 
rural areas than individuals living in urban areas. Regarding the effect on the incidence of 
transfers, the incidence drops more sharply among low-income individuals or individuals 
residing in rural areas.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
V. Concluding Lessons on Intergenerational Transfers  
In this paper, we review the empirical evidence from studies that examine the 
behavioral response of private transfers to public program benefits in the context of 
developing countries. We synthesize information about program design and impact, reporting 
several findings based on the collective evidence from our refined sample of studies. It is 
overwhelmingly clear that public and private transfers often do interact in the context of 
developing countries. However, much remains to be learned about the patterns illuminated in 
this study and the mechanisms that support them.  
 19 
 
In light of the evidence presented here, it is important to consider how new social 
protection programs will influence existing informal transfer networks between, and within, 
private households. In particular, the growing demographic of elderly individuals, a group that 
already faces a disproportionate level of poverty in many developing countries, will 
increasingly be a target of these programs. Therefore, it is important to pay close attention to 
program efficiency, especially in the context of undesirable behavioral responses. If social 
protection programs displace already existing private familial transfers, this could result in 
ineffective redistribution and unattainable poverty objectives – exactly what social protection 
aims to accomplish.  
Because social protection programs generate displacement of private transfers, 
policymakers need to factor in the magnitude of this behavioral response. The robust evidence 
of crowding-out we find across a diverse array identification strategies demonstrates that, in 
developing countries, many private transfers are underpinned by altruism. In particular, we 
review studies that employ difference-in-differences, triple difference, two-stage, and three-
stage least squares experimental designs. All of these identification approaches have produced 
estimates that point to a non-negligible presence of a crowd-out effect. Several lab 
experiments26 also examine the impact of formal insurance on informal markets and report 
estimates consistent with the observational study designs. Of the 29 studies that explicitly 
tested for a crowd-out effect, 23 found an effect, while none except for Kang (2004) found 
crowding-in. 
We document stark heterogeneity of the estimates by important demographic 
characteristics, such as gender and poverty status. Two studies that provide disaggregated 
results by gender, one in Bangladesh (McKernan et al. 2005) and the other in Mexico (Juarez 
2009), report results that appear to be consistent. The pattern shows that if the recipient is 
male, the crowd-out effect is larger than if the recipient is female. Interestingly, in Mexico 
(Juarez 2009), the study reports results that illuminate the interplay between gender and 
poverty status: the crowd-out for a recipient who is female and very poor is considerably 
larger than the crowd-out for a recipient who is female and non-poor. Other studies that 
specifically focus on gender, such as Jensen (2003) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), 
                                                          
26 Landmann, Vollan and Frölich (2012) implement a solidarity game while Lin, Liu and Meng (2014) use a 
dictator game, both find particularly high magnitudes of crowding-out, 62 and 42 percent, respectively. The 
sizeable and consistent measures of crowding-out as well as the corresponding likelihood estimates all point 
toward the notion that altruism is ubiquitous, particularly in the domain of private transfers to the elderly. 
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also exhibit a clear pattern for the crowd-out; however, the pattern is reversed to the one 
found in McKernan et al. (2005) and Juarez (2009). Only one study (i.e., Nikolov and 
Adelman 2019) disaggregates estimates of the crowd-out effect by poverty status: the results 
show that the crowd-out effect is larger for poor versus non-poor households.  
The two aspects of the crowd-out effect, the extensive (the probability of receiving 
any positive private transfers) and the intensive margin (the amount of private transfers 
received by those who receive positive transfers), reinforce each other. This reinforcing nature 
of the two aspects of crowding out may be of use to researchers who are constrained by data 
limitations—it may not be out of the question, for example, to assume the existence of 
crowding-out if one finds a strong decrease in the probability of receiving private transfers 
along with other indications. Aguila, Kapteyn, Robles, and Weidmer (2010) find a decrease in 
the probability of receiving private transfers along with a lower proportion of sampled 
individuals who report their relatives paying their out-of-pocket health expenses. As a result, 
the authors consider crowding-out a distinct possibility without a direct test.  
In specific circumstances, crowding-in could occur (especially if the recipient is of 
low-income status and the existing pre-program private transfers are negligible). Kang (2004) 
uses household data from Nepal and is the only study that demonstrates, in the context of a 
low-income country, that public transfers can lead to the crowding-in of private transfers by 
almost as much as 21 percent. In other words, it shows that public benefits lead to the 
strengthening of the family relationship. A possible explanation of this crowding-in effect is 
that public transfers are not widespread in Nepal (in comparison to other low-income 
countries) and that the average amount of private transfers are too small to be displaced by 
public income benefits. Perhaps the existence of this effect points to less altruism among 
private, informal transfer networks of rural low-income households, but given that this is the 
only study demonstrating a crowd-in effect, some caution in interpreting the result is 
necessary.   
Our interpretation of the accumulating evidence is that, while robust evidence exists 
that social protection programs could result in non-trivial displacements of already existing 
private support systems, there are a number of important caveats related to the type of public 
program, country-setting, and characteristics of the recipient and their extended support 
network. We document consistently large crowd-out effects in response to all social 
protection types. Furthermore, gender and the income level of safety-net recipients can 
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interact in important ways with the willingness of family networks to provide transfers. In 
sum, the relative merit of introducing various safety net benefits and the potential leakage, 
disincentive costs to the program recipients, and displacement effects among inter vivos 
transfers should be compared in choosing an appropriate program.  
Moving forward, future research should focus on understanding the role of various 
mechanisms mediating the magnitude of crowding-out. Factors such as the demographics of 
the country, living standards, the type of risk, and the strength of family networks likely play 
an important role in influencing the magnitude of the behavioral response. Expanding the 
evidence-base with additional research on the role of each of these factors is paramount. More 
broadly, our findings suggest that efforts to account for the displacement of private transfers is 
likely to be crucial for achieving the long-term objectives of effective public policy. 
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Tables  
Table 1: Intergenerational Transfers, Social Assistance Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Study 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy Intervention 
Baseline Mean 
Dependent 
Variable 
Extensive Effect Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
McKernan et al. 
(2005)cg *WP* 
Bangladesh 2 1,800 IV - MLE 
Microcredit programs: Grameen, 
BRAC, BRDB 
6,074 
(Taka) 
 -0.25a   
Van den Berg and 
Cuong (2011)c 
Vietnam 2 4,216 
OLS 
Tobit 
Vietnam's "Growth and Equity" 
strategy (Poverty reduction 
policy) 
716.3 
(VN$ ’000) 
 0   
Attanasio and Rios-
Rull (2000) 
Mexico 3 23,306 
Probit 
Tobit 
Progresa: Conditional-cash 
transfer (CCT) program 
targeting low-income rural 
individuals 
36.18 
(Pesos)e 
  -0.052* -0.22ab 
Albarran and 
Attanasio (2003) 
Mexico 3 23,247 
Probit 
Tobit 
Progresa: Conditional-cash 
transfer (CCT) program 
targeting low-income rural 
individuals 
n/a   -0.4965***  
Kang and Sawada 
(2003)c 
South Korea 3f 
Logit: 
2,867 
Tobit: 
9,915 
Logit 
Tobit 
Public transfers 
133 
(Won '000) 
–0.009*** -0.481***   
Oruc (2011) Bosnia 3 2,790 
Probit 
OLS 
Social transfers following the 
Bosnian War 
33.74 
(KM) 
0.001***    
Mejía-Guevara 
(2015) 
Mexico 3 103,241 n/a 
Transfers from multiple anti-
poverty public polices 
n/a   
 
-0.88abh 
Kananurak and 
Sirisankanan 
(2017)c 
Thailand 3 5,650 
Probit 
Tobit 
Public welfare transfers to 
agricultural households 
15,848.87 
(Baht) 
-7.46E-06 -0.457***   
Gerardi and Tsai 
(2014)ij 
Taiwan 4 5,032 
IV - Probit 
IV - Tobit 
Senior Citizens Welfare Living 
Allowance (age-based 
eligibility) 
4.793 
(NT$ '000) 
  -0.37** -0.66 
Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). The World Bank classification is from 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries (June 2017). The classification is: 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = high 
income. The sample size is the number of observations in the estimation sample. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers 
received  (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the 
introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response of private 
transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement  maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be 
marginal effects. (a) Standard errors were not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual 
basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Baseline mean based on the control group. (f) Country classification at the time of the study. (g) Based on the female sample. (h) Change in private transfers over public 
transfers between 2004 and 1994 as a percent of total consumption. (i) Coefficients represent the effect on transfers given. (j) Observations at individual-level. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 2: Intergenerational Transfers, Social Security and Pension Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Study 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy Intervention 
Baseline 
Mean 
Dependent 
Variable 
Extensive Effect Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program Induced 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Kang 
(2004)d 
Nepal 1 3,120 
Probit 
Tobit 
Pension Benefit Scheme 
568.80 
(Rs) 
  0.206 1.83ab 
Cox and 
Jimenez 
(1995)d 
Philippines 2 175 OLS 
Social Security to urban 
households 
7,585.55 
(Pesos) 
  
 
-0.27a 
Gibson et al. 
(2011)k 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2 1,060 
OLS 
OLS – IV 
OLS - Spline 
Retirement income 
10.024  
 (Kina) 
 
OLS: -0.755 
IV: -0.758 
Spline: -
0.649 
 
 
Cox, Eser, 
and Jimenez 
(1998)d 
Peru 3 
Probit: 
1,387 
Tobit: 182 
Probit 
Tobit 
Social Security Payments 
78 
(Intis) 
 -0.421*** -0.552***  
Jensen 
(2003) 
South 
Africa 
3 815 DDD - OLS Old-Age Pension Income 
201 
(Rand)g 
  
 
-0.30a 
Maitra and 
Ray (2003) 
South 
Africa 
3 8,398 IV - OLS  Old-Age Pension Program n/a  0 
 
 
Juarez 
(2009) 
Mexico 3 9,321 
Tobit 
IV - Tobit 
Nutrition Transfer for Senior 
Adults 
Monthly payments (in Mexico 
City) 
197.24 
(Pesos) 
-0.609 -0.86*** 
 
 
Amuedo-
Dorantes 
and Juarez 
(2015)fh 
Mexico 3 19,298 DDD - OLS 
“70 y Mas” (70 and Above) 
Program 
(Until 2011 non-contributory, 
non means-tested; rural areas) 
254 
(Pesos)g 
  -0.066** -0.37a 
Cheng et al. 
(2016)f 
China 3 412 IV - OLS 
New Rural Pension Scheme 
(Pension benefits) 
1,944.3 
(Yuan) 
 0 
 
 
Galiani et 
al. (2016) 
Mexico 3 1,417 DD 
Adultos Mayores Program 
(Older Adults Program). Non-
contributory, age 70, village with 
at most 2,500 inhabitants 
   
 
0 
Cox and 
Jimenez 
(1992) 
Peru 3 
Probit: 
1,121 
Tobit: 175 
Probit 
 Tobit 
Peru's contributory social 
security program (IPSS): 
Mandatory for formal sector 
employees 
77.70 
(Intis) 
  -0.565*** -0.16a 
 Continued 
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Table 2 (Continued): Intergenerational Transfers, Social Security and Pension Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Study 
Sample Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy Intervention 
Baseline Mean 
Dependent 
Variable 
Extensive Effect Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program 
Induced 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Chen et al. 
(2017)cef 
China 3 
Logistic: 
4,929 
Tobit:1,591 
Logistic 
Tobit  
Urban contributory pension 
(Eligibility at age 60 and 
residence in an urban area) 
2,812.83 
(Yuan) 
-0.054***  0.010*m 
 
 
Gibson et al. 
(2011)j 
China    3 1,103 
OLS 
OLS – IV 
OLS - 
Spline 
Retirement income 
292.978  
 (Yuan) 
 
OLS: 0.001 
IV: 0.001 
Spline: 
-0.041 
 
 
Adelman 
and Nikolov 
(2019)cf 
China 3 11,562 
DD 
IV - Tobit 
IV - OLS 
New Rural Pension 
Scheme (Pension benefits) 
 
4,242.60 
(Yuan) 
-0.067 -0.084 
 
 
Lai and 
Orsuwan 
(2009)d 
Taiwan 4 
(T1): 14,861 
(T2): 25,340 
DD 
OLS 
Old Age Allowance 
T1: 55,986.0 
T2: 44,159.4 
(NT$)i 
 
  
T1: -0.29a 
T2: -0.54a 
Chuang 
(2012)cl 
Taiwan 4 13,681 
Crowd-out 
ratio 
Farmer Allowance (OAFA). 
Eligible for elderly farmers 
already enrolled in farmer 
insurance  
Old Age Allowance (OAA). 
Created in 1994, means-tested 
scheme, replaced in 2008 
   
 
OAFA: -0.92a 
OAA: -0.87a 
Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). The World Bank classification is from 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries (June 2017). The classification is: 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = 
high income. The sample size is the number of observations in the estimation sample. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private 
transfers received  (unless otherwise specified. The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers 
crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) 
report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the 
reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard errors were not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source 
study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Use semi-parametric and non-parametric for empirical estimation and identification. (f) Observations at individual-
level. (g) Baseline mean based on the control group. (h) In Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015), the dependent variable is logged monthly private transfers; the independent variable is 1 if a “treated locality” and 0 
otherwise. The reported coefficient represents the percent average difference in monthly private transfers received between an individual impacted and not impacted by the “70 y mas” program. (i) Mean from treatment 
groups (respectively T1 and T2 in the study). Treatment group T1 comprises very low-income elderly individuals and T2 comprises very-low-income and low-income elderly individuals. (j) Rural sample. (k) Urban 
sample. (l) In the Chuang (2012) study, effects are measured for two programs: old age allowance (OAA), and old age farmer allowance (OAFA). (m) Log-linear specification; represents a 1 percent increase in transfers in 
response to 1,000 yuan.  
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Intergenerational Transfers, Other Insurance Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Study 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy Intervention 
Baseline 
Mean 
Dependent 
Variable 
Extensive 
Effect 
Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program 
Induced 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Cecchi et 
al. (2016)d 
Uganda 1 409 
Probit 
OLS 
NGO's Health Micro-insurance 
Project. Members receive an 
insurance card to be used for 
services provided by contracted 
facilities 
2.89 
(Tokens)i 
  -0.093** -0.10abk 
Cox and 
Jimenez 
(1995)j 
Philippines 2 175 OLS 
Unemployment Insurance to 
urban households 
7,585.55 
(Pesos) 
  
 
-0.91a 
Hasegawa 
(2017) 
Vietnam 2 8,548 
Multinomial-
Logistic 
IV 
Universal Healthcare Goal. 
Health Insurance enacted 2008, 
aimed for universal coverage by 
2014 
n/a   
 
0 
Lenel and 
Steiner 
(2017)d 
*WP* 
 
Cambodia 2 1,320 OLS 
Field-in-the-lab Experiment. 
Test the crowd-out of informal 
insurance support; experiment 
uses dictator and solidarity 
games 
2,155 
(Riel)i 
  
 
-0.28ag 
Strupat and 
Klohn 
(2018)ced 
Ghana 2 
11,731 
4,277 
LPM - OLS 
OLS 
National Health Insurance 
Scheme. Voluntary for the 
informal sector, mandatory for 
formal sector 
71.76 
(GHC) 
  -0.12* -0.20a 
Strupat and 
Klohn 
(2018)cd 
Ghana 2 
11,331 
2,988 
LPM - OLS 
OLS 
National Health Insurance 
Scheme. Voluntary for the 
informal sector, mandatory for 
formal sector 
56.07 
(GHC) 
   -0.09 -0.08a 
 
Continued 
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Table 3 (Continued): Intergenerational Transfers, Other Insurance Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Study 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy Intervention 
Baseline Mean 
Dependent 
Variable 
Extensive Effect Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program 
Induced 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Lin et al. 
(2014)d 
China 3 1,000 
DD 
OLS 
Lab Experiment. Experimentally 
tests the effect of formal insurance 
provision on informal risk-sharing 
using repeated risk-sharing game  
64.2 
(Experimental 
Currency)i 
   
 
-0.21***f 
         
 
 
Orraca-
Romano 
(2015) 
Mexico 3 54,854 
LPM - OLS 
OLS 
Seguro Popular. Health insurance 
free to families located at the bottom 
four deciles of the income 
distribution 
387.9 
(Pesos) 
  -0.0555* -0.23a 
Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). The World Bank classification is from https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-
how-does-the-world-bank-classify-countries (June 2017). The classification is: 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = high income. Sample size reported is the number of observations used in the estimation 
sample. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received  (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total 
effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program 
benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood 
estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard errors are not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source 
study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Analysis for this study was performed at the individual-level. (e) Coefficients represent the effect on transfers given. (f) For Lin et al. (2014): participants offered 21% less in transfers 
as a proportion of the baseline mean transfer when the option to insure was offered. (g) The reported crowd-out in the Lenel and Steiner (2017) study means that participants transferred 28% less as a proportion of the mean baseline transfer 
to those participants who were given the option to insure but declined. (h) Urban households only. (i) Baseline mean based on the control group. (j) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (k) In Cecchi et al. (2016), participants 
with access to insurance transferred 10% less in tokens as a proportion of the mean amount transferred by the control group. For Strupat and Klohn (2018)’s specifications, the first uses transfers given as a dependent variable and the second 
uses transfers received.  
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Social Assistance Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy 
Intervention 
Baseline 
Mean 
Extensive 
Effect 
Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program 
Induced 
Subgroup 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
McKern
an et al. 
(2005)c 
*WP* 
Bangladesh 2 1,800 
IV  
MLE 
Microcredit 
programs: 
Grameen, 
BRAC, BRDB 
6,074 
(Taka) 
 -0.25a 
 
 Female 
      
10,061 
(Taka) 
 -0.30a 
 
 Male 
Oruc 
(2011) 
Bosnia 3 2,790 
Probit 
OLS 
Social transfers 
following the 
Bosnian War 
33.749 
(KM) 
 -0.499   Poor 
 -0.324   Non-poor 
Mejía-
Guevara 
(2015) 
Mexico 3 
36,879 
n/a 
Transfers from 
multiple anti-
poverty public 
polices 
 
 
 
 
 
0.79abe 0 – 5 years of education 
9,933    
 
-2.54abe 16 or more years of education 
Oruc 
(2011) 
Bosnia 3 2,790 
Probit 
OLS 
Social transfers 
following the 
Bosnian War 
33.749 
(KM) 
 -0.123  
 
1st income decile 
 -0.355  2nd income decile 
 0.192  3rd income decile 
 -0.422  4th income decile 
 0.115  5th income decile 
 -0.354  6th income decile 
 -0.87  7th income decile 
 -0.38  8th income decile 
 -0.566  9th income decile 
 -0.463  10th income decile 
Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). WB class is based on the World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle 
income, 3 = upper middle income, 4 = high income. Sample size conveys the number of observations used in estimation. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. Baseline mean represents the average amount 
of the dependent variable (private transfers) from the full sample (unless noted otherwise). All coefficients represent the effect of  social protection on private transfers received  (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures 
the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. 
Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified 
if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard errors are not estimated in source study to determine 
significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Change in private transfers 
over public transfers between 2004 and 1994 as a percent of total consumption. McKernan et al. (2005) use a split-regression; crowding-out in the male subgroup is primarily due to an increase in transfers sent whereas in the female 
subgroup crowding-out is driven by a decrease in transfers received.   
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Social Security and Pension Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy 
Intervention 
Baseline Mean Extensive Effect Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program 
Induced 
Subgroup 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Jensen (2003) South Africa 3 815 DDD - OLS 
Old Age 
Pension 
210 
(Rand)g 
   -0.26a Male 
201 
(Rand)g 
  
 
-0.30a Female 
Adelman and 
Nikolov (2019)cf 
China 3 
5,200 DD 
IV - Tobit 
IV - OLS 
New Rural 
Pension 
Scheme 
4,414.06 
(Yuan) 
0.092 0.105 
  Non-Poor 
2,948  
4278.46 
(Yuan) 
-0.86 -0.986 
 
 Poor 
Amuedo-
Dorantes and 
Juarez (2015)f 
Mexico 3 
Intensive: 
9,212 
Extensive: 
1,186 
DDD - OLS 
70 y Mas (70 
and Above) 
254 
(Pesos)g 
  -0.036 -0.29 Male 
Intensive: 
10,074 
Extensive: 
2,429 
  -0.104** -0.70** Female 
Cox et al. 
(2004) 
Philippines 2 
8,684 
OLS - Spline 
Retirement 
income 
7,724.31 
(Pesos) 
 -0.044* 
 
n/a 
Urban 
9,857 
3,157.74 
(Pesos) 
 -0.101* 
 
Rural 
Cox and 
Jimenez (1995)d 
Philippines 2 
8,429 
OLS 
Social 
security 
5,692.71 
(Pesos) 
 -0.033 
 
n/a Urban 
9,846 
2,660.40 
(Pesos) 
 -0.072 
 
n/a Rural 
Continued 
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Table 5 (Continued): Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Social Security and Pension Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy 
Intervention 
Baseline 
Mean 
Extensive 
Effect 
Total Effect 
Extensive Effect: 
Program 
Total 
Effect: 
Program 
Induced 
Subgroup 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Gibson et al. 
(2011) 
Vietnam 2 
1,656 
OLS 
OLS – IV 
OLS - Spline 
 
Retirement 
income 
10.374 
(VN$  
millions) 
 
OLS: -0.180 
IV: -0.002 
Spline: -0.178 
 
n/a 
 
Urban 
4,072 
3.608 
(VN$  
millions) 
 
OLS: -0.115***  
IV: -0.102** 
Spline:  
-0.117*** 
n/a 
 
Rural 
Gibson et al. 
(2011) 
Indonesia 2 
3,291 
OLS 
OLS – IV 
OLS - Spline 
Retirement 
income 
0.228 
(Rupiah 
millions) 
 
OLS: -0.049 
IV: -0.086 
Spline: -0.045 
 
n/a 
 
Urban 
3,879 
0.058 
(Rupiah 
millions) 
 
OLS: -0.324*** 
IV: -0.346*** 
Spline:  
-0.323*** 
n/a 
 
Rural 
Juarez 
(2009) 
Mexico 3 N/A 
Tobit 
IV - Tobit 
Nutrition 
Transfer for 
Senior Adults 
171.76 
(Peso) 
 -1.019***   
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 700 (pesos) 
       
 
-1.664***   
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 700 (pesos) 
-0.537***   
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 1,000 (pesos) 
-1.022***   
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 1,000 (pesos) 
-0.329***   
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 1,200 (pesos) 
-0.679***   
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 1,200 (pesos) 
 
-0.012***   
Female Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income = 2,100 (pesos) 
-0.043**   
Male Recipient and Pre-Transfer 
Income=2,100 (pesos) 
Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). WB class is based on the World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 = upper middle income, 
4 = high income. Sample size conveys the number of observations used in estimation. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. Baseline mean represents the average amount of the dependent variable (private transfers) from the full sample 
(unless noted otherwise). All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program induced total effect represents 
the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns (10) and (11) report the response 
of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out. When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be marginal effects. (a) Standard 
errors are not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Period of transfers not indicated in source study. (e) Coefficients 
represent the effect on transfers given. (f) Observations at individual-level. (g) Baseline mean is from the control group. (h) Dependent variable is the log of total remittances and independent is binary treatment. Jensen (2003): men receive OAP benefits at an older age 
than women. Therefore, to estimate the effect of a pension increase for men, Jensen uses the same sample with a different DDD estimator. Adelman and Nikolov (2018) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2015) use split-regressions. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Analysis of Intergenerational Transfers. Other Insurance Programs 
Study Country 
WB 
Class 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Strategy 
Policy Intervention 
Baseline 
Mean 
Extensive Effect Total Effect 
Extensive 
Effect: 
Program 
Total Effect: 
Program Induced 
Subgroup 
       
𝜕𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
𝜕𝑌
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
𝜕𝐸(𝑇)
𝜕𝑌 
 
∆𝑃𝑟( 𝑇 > 0) 
∆𝑃
∗ 𝐸(𝑇 | 𝑇 >  0) 
∆𝐸(𝑇)
∆𝑃 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Orraca-
Romano 
(2015) 
Mexico 3 n/a 
OLS 
LPM 
Seguro Popular 
387.9 
(Pesos) 
 
 
-0.0892 -0.37ab Female 
 
 
-0.0506 -0.21ab Male 
 
 
-0.0444 -0.18ab Urban 
 
 
-0.0776 -0.32ab Rural 
 
 
-0.0677 -0.28ab Low Income 
 
 
-0.0457 -0.18ab High Income 
 
 
-0.0762* -0.31ab 
Low Health 
Expenditure 
 
 
-0.0273 -0.11ab 
High Health 
Expenditure 
Strupat and 
Klohn 
(2018) ced 
Ghana 2 
4,136 
Probit 
OLS 
National Health Insurance 
Scheme. Voluntary for the 
informal sector, mandatory for 
formal sector 
 
71.76 
(GHC) 
 
 
-0.0813 
n/a 
Children or 
parents 
3,623  
 
-0.182 
Extended 
family or 
siblings 
3,813  
 
-0.259 
Non-
relatives 
Strupat and 
Klohn 
(2018) cd 
Ghana 2 
4,018 
Probit 
OLS 
National Health Insurance 
Scheme. Voluntary for the 
informal sector, mandatory for 
formal sector 
56.07 
(GHC) 
 
 
-0.0709 
n/a 
Children or 
parents 
3,590  
 
-0.141 
Extended 
family or 
siblings  
3,706  
 
-0.155 
Non-
relatives  
Notes: All transfers for the dependent variable are on a monthly basis (unless noted otherwise) and provided at the household level (unless noted otherwise). WB class is based on the World Bank list of economies (June 2017) 1 = low income, 2 = lower middle income, 3 
= upper middle income, 4 = high income. Sample size conveys the number of observations used in estimation. Bolded estimation strategy denotes coefficients are from its result. Baseline mean represents the average amount of the dependent variable (private transfers) 
from the full sample unless otherwise specified. All coefficients represent the effect of social protection on private transfers received (unless otherwise specified). The total effect measures the dollar-for-dollar crowd-out of private by public transfers. The program 
induced total effect represents the proportion of private transfers crowded-out from the introduction of public transfers, denominators vary across studies. Columns (8) and (9) report the response of private transfers to an income change (of program benefits); Columns 
(10) and (11) report the response of private transfers to a change in program participation. Zero crowd-out effect specified if the author explicitly reports no crowding-out When studies implement maximum likelihood estimation, the reported estimates are assumed to be 
marginal effects. (a) Standard errors are not estimated in source study to determine significance levels of effect size estimates. (b) Effect size calculated from estimates in the source study. (c) Transfers measured on an annual basis. (d) Analysis for this study was 
performed at the individual level. (e) Coefficients represent the effect on transfers given. Orraca-Romano (2015) uses split-regression and does not report sample size with subgroup estimation; crowd-out effects are calculated by multiplying the extensive coefficient by 
the mean amount of private transfers received by uninsured households prior to the program. This number is then divided by the estimated effect of Seguro Popular on health expenditures for the main sample. Strupat and Klohn (2018) implement a split-regression on 
subgroups with varying degrees of kinship, e.g., the subgroup with the greatest kinship includes transfers only if they are received by a parent or child; the first specification uses a dependent variable consisting of transfers given, while the second uses transfers received.  
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
